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CALIFORNIA DREAMING: THE CALIFORNIA SECURE
CHOICE RETIREMENT SAVINGS TRUST ACT
EDWARD A. ZELINSKY*
***
Half of American workers are not covered by employer-sponsored
retirement arrangements. The recently passed California Secure Choice
Retirement Savings Trust Act seeks to solve this problem by mandating
retirement savings arrangements for California employers, coupled with a
public investment vehicle for investing these private retirement savings.
The Act is important because of California’s size and status as a
trendsetter for other states.
This Article is the first to examine the important legal questions the Act
raises under the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA. Contrary to the
drafters’ intent, the savings accounts authorized under the Act do not
qualify as individual retirement accounts under the Code. Hence,
employees participating in savings arrangements established under the Act
will not receive the income tax benefits associated with individual
retirement accounts.
If the Act were to be amended to make its accounts individual retirement
accounts, the Act would survive ERISA preemption under New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
514 U.S. 645 (1995), though not under Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85 (1983). Since Travelers is the Court’s more recent and more
compelling construction of ERISA preemption, the Act should survive
ERISA preemption if the Act is amended to have true individual retirement
accounts.

*

Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. For comments on prior
drafts of this article, he thanks Professors Jonathan Barry Forman, Paul
Secunda, and Norman Stein and Attorney Alvin D. Lurie. For research
assistance, Professor Zelinsky thanks Richard Gove and Louise Loeb, both
of the Cardozo Class of 2013, and Gulsah Senoh and John R. Doran of the
Cardozo Class of 2014.
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A final section of this article addresses the choices other state legislatures,
as well as Congress, confront if they elect to follow part or all of the path
on which California has embarked to encourage private retirement
savings. President Obama has recently proposed a federal mandate under
which employers with more than ten employees would be required to
maintain either retirement plans or IRA coverage. The President’s
proposal ensures public debate about the appropriate function of
government in encouraging retirement savings. The Golden State’s Act
will play an important role in that debate. In that debate, I favor state-bystate experimentation rather than any single approach to the task of
encouraging greater retirement savings.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

By signing the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust
Act (“the Act”), Governor Edmund (“Jerry”) Brown, Jr. took an important
step toward establishing a retirement savings mandate for Golden State
employers, coupled with a public investment vehicle for private retirement
savings.1 By simultaneously signing S.B. 923,2 Governor Brown
guaranteed further debate about the Act and its provisions since S.B. 923
requires an additional vote of the California legislature before the Act can
be implemented.3 The Act represents the first tentative success of
nationwide efforts to create state-sponsored private retirement programs.4
1

S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); see Laura Mahoney, California
Governor Signs Bills to Create Pension Mandate for Private Employers, DAILY
TAX REP. (BNA) No. 190, at H-2 (Oct. 2, 2012).
2
S.B. 923, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); Mahoney, supra note 1.
3
See S.B. 9232012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100043.5 to the
CAL. GOV’T CODE (2013)).
4
See Florence Olsen, California Leads, No State Has Green Light For StateBased Private Retirement Accounts, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (BNA) (Aug. 7,
2013). For examples of other states’ efforts, see Brent Hunsberger, Oregon House
Passes Bill to Examine Statewide Retirement Savings Plan, OREGON LIVE (June
24, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com/finance/index.ssf/2013/06/oregon_house
_passes_bill_to_ex.html; National Conference of State Legislatures, State
Sponsored
Retirement
Savings
Plans
for
Non-Public
Employees,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/state-sponsored-retirement-plans-fornonublic.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
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The Act is important, not only because of California’s size and status as a
trendsetter, but because the task the Act addresses is pressing: increasing
the retirement savings of the half of American workers not currently
covered by employer-sponsored retirement arrangements.5
I write to explore the legal status of the Act, in particular the Act’s
standing under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)6 and the Internal Revenue Code (Code).7 The Act raises three
important questions under ERISA and the Code: Are the accounts
established by the Act individual retirement accounts for purposes of the
Code? Does ERISA preempt the employer mandate established by the
Act? Does ERISA preempt the Act’s provisions authorizing supplemental
employer contributions to employees’ accounts established under the Act?
The drafters of the Act were acutely sensitive to all three of these
questions.8
The accounts created by the Act do not qualify as individual
retirement accounts under the Code. The hallmark of an individual
5

DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS 124 (Apr. 2013)
(“Tens of millions of U.S. households have not placed themselves on a path to
become financially prepared for retirement. In addition, the proportion of U.S.
workers participating in employer-sponsored plans has remained stagnant for
decades at no more than about half the total work force . . . .”).
6
ERISA was originally adopted as the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) and has repeatedly been
amended. Many provisions of ERISA were adopted twice, once as tax law
additions to the Internal Revenue Code and once as additions to Title 29 of the
United States Code, enforced by the Department of Labor. It is today customary to
refer to the labor provisions codified in Title 29 as “ERISA” and to refer to the tax
provisions of ERISA by their respective designations in the Internal Revenue Code.
This article follows this convention. On the dual tax/labor structure of ERISA, see
JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 97 (5th ed.
2010).
7
26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
8
See S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100043 to the
CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012) (program not to be implemented “if it is determined that
the program is an employee benefit plan under” ERISA or if the employees’
accounts under the program “fail to qualify” as IRAs) and §§ 100004(e) and
100012(k) (supplementary employer contributions to be permitted only if such
contributions “would not cause the program to be treated as an employee benefit
plan under” ERISA)).
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account for retirement planning purposes is the direct and unmediated
assignment to the account holder of the rewards of good investment
performance and the costs of investment loss. In contrast, the accounts
created under the Act are notional in nature, formula-based cash balancestyle defined benefit claims against a collective trust fund. These notional
accounts are credited with an assumed rate of return determined before the
beginning of the year, regardless of the Trust’s actual investment
experience during the year. The Trust established by the California Act
(not the individual employee/account holder) bears investment risk and is
liable for underfunding. The formula-based, cash balance-style accounts
created by the Act do not qualify under the Code as individual retirement
accounts as these accounts will not be decreased to reflect investment
losses and will not directly benefit from current investment gains.
Suppose, however, that the Act is amended to make its accounts
individual retirement accounts for purposes of Code § 408 by shifting
investment reward and downside to the account holder. In this case, the
ERISA preemption status of the Act’s employer mandate reflects the
Court’s contradictory guidance on ERISA preemption: ERISA § 514(a)9
preempts the Act’s employer mandate under Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.10
but not under the Court’s later decision in New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.11 Since
Travelers is the Court’s more recent and more persuasive approach to
ERISA preemption, Travelers should control. Thus, assuming amendment
of the Act to convert the Act’s accounts into individual retirement
accounts, the Act’s employer mandate should not be ERISA-preempted.
My conclusion is similar as to the third legal issue raised by the
Act, whether ERISA preempts the provisions of the Act which authorize
supplementary employer contributions to employees’ accounts established
under the Act: this provision of the Act is ERISA-preempted under Shaw
but survives § 514(a) scrutiny under Travelers’ more recent, more flexible,
and more compelling approach to ERISA preemption.
In light of the foregoing, if Travelers controls (as it should), the
Act could, as a legal matter, be salvaged by recasting the Act’s accounts as
individual retirement accounts under which the employee/individual
account holders bear investment risk and thus benefit directly from
9

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
See 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983).
11
See 514 U.S. 645, 701 (1995).
10
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investment gains and incur the costs of investment losses. However, as the
Act is currently structured, the Act fails muster under the Code because the
notional accounts created by the Act do not qualify as individual retirement
accounts.
There is, thus, a road map for amending the Act to make it Code
and ERISA-compliant under Travelers: reformulate the accounts
established under the Act as individual retirement accounts with
investment reward and investment loss assigned to the account holder,
rather than the current notional, formula-based design of the Act’s
accounts. However, under Shaw, there is no equivalent road map. Since
Travelers is the Supreme Court’s more recent and more convincing
approach to ERISA preemption, the Act should be salvageable by
converting its accounts to individual retirement accounts that allocate
investment gain and loss to the account holders.
This Article first outlines the Act and then identifies five
noteworthy features of the Act including the Act’s linkage of its employer
mandate for retirement savings with a public investment vehicle for those
savings as well as the Act’s characterization of the interests it creates as
“accounts” rather than as annuities. Part IV then discusses ERISA
preemption, focusing upon the tension between Shaw and Travelers, and
next introduces payroll deduction IRA arrangements. In Part VI, this
article explains its conclusions as to the three major issues raised by the
Act under ERISA and the Code: the notional cash balance-style accounts
created by the Act do not qualify as individual retirement accounts since
the accounts established by the Act create a defined benefit-type, formulabased claim against a collectively-managed fund. Individual retirement
accounts instead allocate investment gain and loss directly to the individual
account holder. If the Act were amended to recast its accounts as
individual retirement accounts, the Act’s employer withholding mandate
and the Act’s authorization of voluntary employer contributions should
survive ERISA preemption under Travelers.
Legality, of course, is not the same as wisdom. Thus, the final
section addresses the choices other state legislatures, as well as Congress,
confront if they elect to follow part or the entire path on which California
has embarked to encourage private retirement savings. Among these
choices are an employer mandate without a state-sponsored savings vehicle
like the California Trust, the augmentation of the federal tax credits for
retirement plans and retirement savings with supplementary state tax
credits, and the promotion of retirement savings through public education.
Other legislatures may reasonably conclude that there is no role for the
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states to play in light of both the robust market for retirement savings
products and the federal government’s support for such savings.
President Obama has recently proposed a federal mandate under
which employers with more than ten employees would be required to
maintain either retirement plans or IRA coverage.12 However, the Obama
proposal would not create the kind of public investment vehicle established
under the California Act. The President’s proposal ensures public debate
about the appropriate function of government in encouraging retirement
savings. The Golden State’s Act will play an important role in that debate.
In that debate, I favor state-by-state experimentation rather than any single
approach to the task of encouraging greater retirement savings.
II.

THE ACT, THE TRUST AND THE PROGRAM DESCRIBED

The Act13 creates a nine-member board14 (“the board”) to
administer the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust15 (“the
Trust”). The Trust will “offer . . . a retirement savings program” to be
known as the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Program16
(“the program”). Integral to the program is an employer mandate,
requiring California employers to maintain for their employees a “payroll
deposit retirement savings arrangement.”17 Under these mandated
arrangements, employees in the Golden State otherwise without
employment-based retirement savings options will be able to contribute to
12

See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 5, at 125.
S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012).
14
Id. at § 3 (adding § 100002 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). In its original
incarnation, the Act established a seven member board consisting of the Treasurer
of California, California’s Director of Finance “or his or her designee,” the
Controller of California, “[a]n individual with retirement savings and investment
expertise appointed by the Senate Committee on Rules,” two gubernatorial
appointees (one “[a] small business representative,” the other “[a] public member”)
and “[a]n employee representative appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly.” Id.
Senate Bill 923 then amended the Act to add two additional members to the board
appointed by the Governor with no restrictions. See S.B. 923, 2012 Leg., Reg.
Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 1000002(a)(1)(H) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE
(2013)).
15
S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100004(a) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE
(2013)).
16
Id. (adding § 100000(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
17
Id. (adding §§ 100000(g) and 100032(d) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
13
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accounts managed by the Trust through employer withholding from
employees’ paychecks.18
Within nine months “after the board opens the program for
enrollment,”19 private and nonprofit employers20 in the Golden State must
have such a payroll “arrangement to allow employee participation in the
program”21 through payroll deductions unless one of several statutory
exemptions applies. Under one of these exemptions, an employer need not
maintain a state-sponsored payroll deduction arrangement if the employer
has fewer than five employees.22 Moreover, employees cannot participate
in the California program if they are covered by the Railway Labor Act23
or by a multiemployer pension plan.24 In addition, a California employer
need not enroll employees in the state-run program established by the Act
if the employer sponsors its own retirement program for its employees25 or
if the employer has in place an IRA payroll deduction plan for its
employees.26
Thus, when it takes effect, the Act will promulgate an employer
retirement savings mandate for California employers. Under the Act’s
mandate, Golden State employers with five or more employees will be
required to have one of three forms of retirement savings arrangements for
their employees, i.e., an employer-sponsored plan (including a
multiemployer or railroad pension), a payroll IRA deduction plan or, as the
default option, a state-sponsored “payroll deposit retirement savings
arrangement”27 under the California program established by the Act.28
18

Id. (adding § 100012(j) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
Id. (adding § 100032(d) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). During this ninemonth period, larger employers must offer payroll deposit retirement savings
arrangements. Id. (adding §§ 100032(b) and 100032(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE
(2012)).
20
Id. (adding § 100000(d) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). Public employers
are specifically exempted from the requirements of the Act. Id.
21
Id. (adding § 100032(d) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
22
See id. (adding § 100000(d) to the CL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
23
Id. (adding § 100000(c)(2)(A-B) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
24
Id. (adding § 100000(c)(2)(B) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
25
Id. (adding §§ 100032(d) and 100032(f) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
26
Id.
27
Id. (adding § 100000(f) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
28
Employers employing four or fewer employees can participate in the
program, though they are not required to do so. Id. (adding § 100032(a) to the CAL.
GOV’T CODE (2012) (“[A]ny employer may choose to have a payroll deposit
19
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When a California employer maintains a payroll savings deposit
arrangement pursuant to the state-sponsored program, any of the
employer’s employees will be able to affirmatively elect against
participation in such arrangement.29 Absent such an election of
nonparticipation, each California employee covered by the state-run
program will “contribute 3 percent of the employee’s annual salary or
wages to the program”30 through employer withholding. However, the Act
provides that an employee may specify a contribution rate other than 3%.31
The Act also provides that the board “may adjust the contribution” rate
under the program to as little as 2% of an employee’s compensation and as
much as 4% of an employee’s compensation”32 and may “vary” the
program’s contribution rate between 2% and 4% “according to the length
of time the employee has contributed to the program.”33
Employee contributions pursuant to the program will be withheld
by employers and remitted to the Trust.34 The Act also permits employers
to make supplementary contributions from their own funds to employees’
accounts under the program as long as such employer contributions “would
not cause the program to be treated as an employee benefit plan under”
ERISA.35
The Trust will provide a public vehicle for the investment of
employees’ retirement savings. The Trust and the program, governed by a
public board,36 will collect and provide for the investment of those

retirement savings arrangement to allow employee participation in the program.”)).
29
Id. (adding §§ 100032(e)(1) and 100032(g) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE
(2012)).
30
Id. (adding § 100032(h) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
31
Id.
32
Id. (adding § 100032(i) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
33
Id.
34
Id. (adding §§ 100000(g) and 100012(j) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
35
Id. (adding §§ 100004(e) and 100012(k) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
Employer contributions cause the California program to become an employee
benefit plan for ERISA purposes since such employer contributions transform a
payroll deposit IRA arrangement limited to employees’ contributions into an
employee benefit plan with employer contributions. However, such employer
contributions do not trigger preemption under ERISA § 514(a) as explicated by
Travelers. See infra notes 104-24 and accompanying text
36
Id. (adding § 100002 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012), as subsequently
amended by S.B. 923, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2012)).

2014

CALIFORNIA DREAMING

555

savings.37 The monies held in the Trust may, at the board’s election, be
invested by the treasurer of California.38 Alternatively, the board can
arrange for the Trust’s funds to be invested by the board of the California
state pension plan39 (commonly known as CalPERS)40 or by “private
money managers,”41 or by some combination of CalPERS and private
managers.42 Among the board’s other powers in its “capacity of trustee”43
of the Trust, the board can “[p]rocure insurance against any loss in
connection with the property, assets, or activities of the trust, and secure
private underwriting and reinsurance to manage risk and insure the
retirement savings rate of return.”44
If the board does not purchase such insurance to protect against
losses, the board must instead provide an “annuity, or other funding
mechanism . . . at all times that protects the value of individuals’
accounts.”45
Withholding by participating employers under the program is
intended to qualify as “payroll deposit IRA arrangements.”46 Each
employee contributing to the Trust through employer withholding will
have a notional account in the Trust.47 These notional accounts are
intended to qualify as individual retirement accounts under Code § 408.48
The Act specifically prohibits the board from implementing “the program
if the IRA arrangements” offered under the program “fail to qualify for the
favorable federal income tax treatment ordinarily accorded to IRAs under
the Internal Revenue Code . . . .”49 This favorable treatment includes the
37

According to the Act, the Trust is intended to be financially self-sustaining,
paying its administrative costs from the assets contributed to the Trust. See id.
(adding §§ 100004(c) and 100042 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
38
Id. (adding § 100004(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
39
Id.
40
See CALPERS, www.calpers.ca.gov (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
41
S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100004(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE
(2012)).
42
Id.
43
Id. (adding § 100010(a) introductory language to the CAL. GOV’T CODE
(2012)).
44
Id.
45
Id. (adding § 1000013 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
46
Id. (adding § 100008(a) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
47
Id. (adding § 100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
48
Id. (adding § 100043 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
49
Id. An interesting issue that need not be addressed today is whether the Trust
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tax-free growth of investments held within individual retirement
accounts,50 the deductibility of contributions to traditional individual
retirement accounts,51 and the exclusion from income taxation of qualified
distributions from Roth individual retirement accounts.52
Each employee’s account under the program is notional in
nature.53 Each such account will be credited with the employee’s
contributions54 through the employer’s payroll withholding as well as with
the “[S]tated interest rate”55 selected annually and prospectively by the
board and with the Trust’s “excess earnings”56 which the board may, but
not need, allocate to employees’ accounts. During each year, the board is
“to declare the stated rate at which interest shall be allocated to program
accounts for the following program year.”57
There is no provision in the Act for allocating investment losses to
employees’ accounts or otherwise adjusting such accounts downward to
reflect such losses. The employee’s “retirement savings benefit under the
program”58 will be a claim against the Trust in “an amount equal to the
balance in the [employee’s] program account.”59
As I discuss infra,60 since the Trust’s investment gains will not
directly pass through to the notional accounts created under the Act, those
accounts will not qualify as individual retirement accounts under the Code.
The Trust, when it sets “the stated interest rate,” can pass through some,
all, or none of the Trust’s prior investment earnings. Similarly, the board
can retroactively credit accounts with some, all or none of the Trust’s
“excess” earnings above the stated rate of return. The board has no
would be tax exempt under I.R.C. § 115 (2006) as a governmental agency if the
accounts established by the Act do not qualify as IRAs. Since the Act will not go
into effect unless the accounts created by the Act are IRAs, this issue need not be
confronted, at least for now.
50
I.R.C. § 408(e)(1) (2011).
51
I.R.C. § 219 (2011).
52
I.R.C. § 408A(d)(1) (2011).
53
S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100008(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE
(2012)).
54
Id. (adding § 100008(a) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
55
Id. (adding §§ 100000(h) and 100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
56
Id. (adding § 100006(a-c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
57
Id. (adding § 100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
58
Id. (adding § 100008(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
59
Id.
60
See infra notes 134-35.
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authority to reduce account balances to reflect the Trust’s investment
losses. These features of the accounts created under the Act preclude those
accounts from constituting individual retirement accounts under the Code
since the Trust’s investment gains and losses do not pass directly to
accounts, but are instead mediated through the decisions of the board and
through the formulas the board determines.
The Act provides that the State of California has no “liability in
connection with funding retirement benefits pursuant to” the program.61
The board is not to implement the program if employees’ accounts
under the program “fail to qualify” as IRAs under the Internal Revenue
Code62 or “if it is determined that the program is an employee benefit plan
under” ERISA.63 Moreover, under S.B. 923, the provisions of the Act will
go into effect only if another vote of the California legislature approves the
program and the Trust.64
III.

FIVE NOTEWORTHY FEATURES OF THE ACT, THE TRUST
AND THE PROGRAM

Five features of the Act, the Trust and the program are noteworthy.
First, the Act links its employer mandate to withhold and remit employees’
retirement contributions to the state-created (but not state-guaranteed)
Trust holding and investing such contributions. However, an employer
mandate need not be adopted together with a public investment vehicle like
the Trust.
A state legislature determined to mandate employee retirement
saving could instead require all employers to maintain a qualified plan or
an IRA payroll deduction arrangement without establishing the kind of
61

S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding §§ 100013, 100014(c)(3), and 100036 to
the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
62
Id. (adding §§ 100043 and 100010(a)(11) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012),
authorizing the board “in the capacity of trustee” to “[s]et minimum and maximum
investment levels in accordance with contribution limits set for IRAs by the
Internal Revenue Code.”). Presumably, the individual employee will be given the
choice between conventional IRA tax treatment under I.R.C. § 408 or Roth IRA
treatment under I.R.C. § 408A – if the Act’s accounts are modified to qualify as
individual retirement accounts.
63
Id.
64
S.B. 923, 2012 Leg. Reg. Sess. at § 2 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100043.5 to the
CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
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state-sponsored accounts to be managed by the California Trust. This is
the approach embodied in President Obama’s proposal to establish a
national employer mandate requiring retirement savings opportunities in
the workplace without establishing any public investment vehicle for such
savings.65
One could also envision a legislature creating a voluntary statesponsored investment trust for retirement savings (like current section 529
college savings programs)66 without the legislature simultaneously
enacting an employer mandate requiring workplace savings arrangements.
However, the California Act links its employer mandate to a public
investment vehicle by sending to the Trust all employee contributions
withheld by employers pursuant to the program established under the Act.
A second notable feature of the California Act is the Act’s attempt
to qualify employees’ accounts under the Act as individual retirement
accounts. Individual retirement accounts are today ubiquitous instruments
for holding employees’ retirement wealth.67 However, as I discuss infra,68
employees’ accounts under the California program are not individual
retirement accounts, defined contribution devices under which account
owners benefit directly from the gains earned by those assets while bearing
the losses incurred by those assets. Instead, the employees’ interests in
their notional accounts in the California Trust resemble participants’
entitlements under cash balance pension plans. Cash balance plans are
defined benefit arrangements. An employee covered by a cash balance
pension has a notional account to which is credited contributions and an
assumed rate of interest.69
On retirement, the cash balance participant is entitled to receive
the balance in his notional account, rather than an amount which reflects
65

See supra note 5.
See EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW
THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 64-70 (2007)
(discussing Section 529 plans).
67
See id. at 39-42 (discussing IRAs).
68
See infra notes 134-35.
69
See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan: A
Critique, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1-1—1-19 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2007); Alvin D. Lurie,
Murphy’s Law Strikes Again: Twilight For Cash Balance Design?, 101 TAX
NOTES 393 (Oct. 20, 2003); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy,
19 VA. TAX REV. 683 (2000).
66
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the value of the underlying assets held by the plan. If the employees’ cash
balance accounts aggregate to more than the assets in the plan, the
sponsoring employer is obligated to fund this difference. Conversely, if
the assets held by a cash balance pension exceed the total of the
employees’ notional accounts, those extra assets may revert to the
employer.70 Thus, as a defined benefit plan, a cash balance pension assigns
the benefits and downsides of investment performance to the sponsoring
employer.
The accounts created by the Act resemble this kind of cash
balance arrangement rather than an individual retirement account under
which investment risk is, for better or worse, assigned to the account
holder. The Act does not authorize the allocation of investment losses to
the accounts authorized by the Act. Under the Act, there is no direct
connection between the Trust’s investment gains and the balances of such
accounts. Rather, the Trust’s investment gains will be mediated through
the board’s selection of a stated rate of return for employees’ accounts and
by the board’s decisions to allocate (or not) some or all of the Trust’s
“excess” investment gains above the stated rate of return. That stated
return, to be picked before the year begins, may prove higher, the same or
lower than the Trust’s actual investment performance. As I discuss infra,71
because the cash balance-style accounts established under the Act do not
assign investment risk to the employee/account holders, such accounts do
not qualify as individual retirement accounts under the Code.
Third, the Act repeatedly and specifically characterizes
participants’ interests under the programs as “accounts” rather than as
annuities.72 The Act does not subject the Trust to California’s regulation of
insurance companies73 or purport to characterize the Trust as an insurance
company. Thus, as I discuss further infra,74 the notional accounts
established by the Act not only fail to qualify as individual retirement
accounts under the Code, but they also are not individual retirement
annuities for purposes of Code § 408(b).75
A fourth notable feature of the Golden State’s program is its
70

Such a reversion is subject to an excise tax. 26 I.R.C. § 4980(a) (2010).
See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
72
See generally S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adding §
100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE).
73
See generally CAL. INS. CODE.
74
See discussion infra 166-176 and accompanying text.
75
See 26 U.S.C. § 408(b) (2006).
71
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automatic enrollment of eligible employees, subject to each employee’s
ability to opt out of the program if the employee so chooses. The
program’s automatic enrollment feature reflects the influential
observations of behavioral economists that individuals are often subject to
inertia and procrastination in making important decisions like the decision
to save for retirement.76 From the premise of inertia and procrastination,
many commentators conclude that higher participation rates can be
achieved in 401(k) and similar retirement savings arrangements if
employees are presumptively included in such arrangements and required
to elect out, rather than being obligated to affirmatively elect coverage
under such arrangements.77 Just as procrastination and inertia discourage
employees from electing to save for retirement, procrastination and inertia
discourage employees from electing against such saving when saving is
presumptive and must be affirmatively rejected.
This insight of behavioral economics led Congress to amend Code
§ 401(k) to authorize sponsoring employers to adopt automatic enrollment
provisions.78 Under these provisions, employees contribute from their
salaries to their retirement accounts unless such employees choose not to
contribute. Initial “[s]tudies have shown that automatically enrolling
people into 401(k) plans can achieve higher levels of participation.”79 In
this spirit, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act mandates that
large employers must automatically enroll their covered employees into
employer-sponsored health plans, subject to the employees’ ability to opt
out.80 The California Act and the program the Act creates embrace this
76

Hanming Fang and Dan Silverman, Distinguishing Between Cognitive
Biases, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 51, 55-56 (Edward J. McCaffery and Joel
Slemrod eds., 2006).
77
See id.; WILLIAM J. CONGDON ET AL., POLICY AND CHOICE 77-79 (2011);
James J. Choi et al., Saving for Retirement on the Path of Least Resistance, in
BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 76, at 304; Annie Lowrey, Tax Breaks
and Savings Play Role in Budget Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2012, at A19
(“policies that automatically saved a portion of a worker’s income increased total
savings by a substantial amount.”).
78
26 I.R.C. § 401(k)(13) (2006). See also Fran Hawthorne, Heading for
Retirement on Autopilot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013.
79
Jonathan Barry Forman & Gordon D. Mackenzie, Optimal Rules for Defined
Contribution Plans: What Can We Learn from the U.S. and Australian Pension
Systems 36 (Austl. Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954879.
80
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1511,
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increasingly fashionable pattern of automatic enrollment under which
eligible employees presumptively contribute to their respective program
accounts unless they affirmatively reject such contributions.81
A fifth notable feature of the Act is the acknowledgment of the
problem of implicit government guarantees and the Act’s explicit
repudiation of any such guarantees. Recent discussion about implicit
government guarantees has occurred in the context of banks and other
financial institutions deemed “too big to fail,” as well as governmentsponsored entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.82 Important
commentators suggest that these large institutions and entities benefit from
an unstated but widely-accepted understanding that the federal government
could not permit any of these institutions or entities to become insolvent.83
From this vantage, there is an implicit guarantee that the federal
government will again bail out many of these institutions and entities, as
the federal government did during the Great Recession.
The Act explicitly and repeatedly warns that the State of California
is not liable to the employees who participate in the program.84 According
to the Act, participating employees must be paid from the assets of the
Trust including any private insurance coverage the Trust may purchase to
guarantee the program’s promises to such employees.85 While the Act
reiterates that the treasury of the Golden State does not stand behind the
Trust or the program, some critics suggest that, despite the Act’s
disclaimer of state liability to the employees who participate in the
program, in a crunch, no future governor or legislature of California could
in fact stand by idly if the Trust lacked the financial ability to pay the
124 Stat. 119, 252 (2010) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 by
adding § 18A, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 218A (2010)).
81
President Obama takes a similar approach in his proposal for a federal
employer mandate for workplace retirement savings. See supra text accompanying
notes 4-5.
82
See, e.g., SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS (2012); ANDREW ROSS
SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS – AND
THEMSELVES (2009); Gretchen Morgenson, One Safety Net That Needs to Shrink,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2012, at BU1.
83
See, e.g., Bair, supra note 82, at 28 (“The moral hazard problem is worse for
very large institutions that the market perceives as being too big to fail.”).
84
See S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding §§ 100013,
100014(c)(3) and 100036 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
85
Id. (adding § 100010(a)(9) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
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account balances of such employees.86 In discussion of S.B. 1234, the
California Department of Finance expressed this concern that California’s
treasury might ultimately wind up responsible for the program’s
commitments.87 However, the text of the Act is explicit that the Golden
State’s public treasury does not stand behind the Trust.
IV.

ERISA PREEMPTION: Shaw v. Travelers

ERISA’s preemption clause, ERISA § 514(a),88 is extremely broad:
ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” regulated by ERISA.
Starting with its decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.89 through District
of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade,90 the U.S. Supreme
Court interpreted § 514(a) expansively.91 Under the case law developed
during this period, § 514(a) preempts any state law which “has a
connection with or reference to” an employee benefit plan.92 Under this
86

See, e.g., Frank Keegan, Private Pension Plan Would Raid Taxpayers to Fill
Public Pension Gap, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 29, 2012, at A13 (“But the
overriding question left answered on the issue of `guaranteed’ retirement income is:
guaranteed by whom? Answer: taxpayers, the same people now stuck with the
insurmountable debt of a retirement system in an accelerating death spiral.”); Rich
Danker, California Doubles Down on Pension Promising, CONTRA COSTA TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2012, at A13 (The Act “confuses retirement as an expectation, rather than
an objective.”); Judy Lin, The Problems with SB1234, ASSOC. OF CAL. LIFE &
HEALTH INS. CO., May 30, 2012 (“Funding shortfalls and huge taxpayer
liabilities.”).
87
See Kevin DeLeon, Department of Finance Bill Analysis (May 2, 2012) (on
file with the California Department of Finance) (“Despite the bill’s stated intent to
shield the state from financial liability, the state ultimately could be responsible for
benefit payments under federal law, putting the state at serious risk of billions of
dollars in unfunded liabilities if investment performance falters under the
Program.”).
88
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
89
See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
90
See D.C. v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
91
For a detailed discussion of this initial stage of the Court’s interpretation of
ERISA § 514(a), see Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the
New Jurisprudence of ERISA Preemption, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 815-27
(1999).
92
See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97.
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unforgiving standard, ERISA preemption is nearly automatic.93
The Court subsequently retreated from Shaw’s formulation of
ERISA preemption, without (so far, at least) acknowledging that retreat. In
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co.,94 the Court formulated a more restrained (though still quite
broad) understanding of ERISA § 514(a), presuming “that Congress does
not intend to supplant state law.”95
Travelers involved surcharges New York State imposed as part of
its regulation of hospital rates. Pursuant to this regulation, hospitals
charged patients covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield, by Medicaid, or by an
HMO only basic billing rates for their hospital stays. Other patients, e.g.,
those covered by commercial insurers, by self-insured funds, or by
volunteer firefighter benefits, paid to the hospital a 13% surcharge for their
hospitalizations. Hospitalized patients covered by commercial insurance
also paid a second surcharge of 11%, which the hospital remitted to the
state. The impact of these surcharges was to encourage employers to
switch their medical plans from commercial insurance and self-funding to
Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage to achieve lower net costs for their
employees’ hospitalizations.
In a straightforward application of Shaw and its expansive test for
ERISA preemption (“connection with or reference to”), the Second
Circuit96 held that ERISA § 514(a) preempted New York’s hospital
surcharges. These surcharges, the appeals court concluded, improperly
burdened employers’ ERISA-regulated health care plans with higher costs
if such plans declined to use Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance coverage.
In a sharp (but, so far, unacknowledged) break with Shaw, the
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and upheld the Empire State’s
hospital surcharges against ERISA preemption challenge.
The
interpretation of § 514(a) in any situation, Travelers declares, starts with
the “presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.”97
Through § 514(a), Congress sought “to avoid a multiplicity of [state]
regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of
employee benefit plans.”98 The danger to such national uniformity is
93

See Zelinsky, supra note 91, at 816.
514 U.S. 645 (1995) [hereinafter Travelers].
95
See id. at 654.
96
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1993).
97
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654.
98
Id. at 657.
94
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greatest when a state law dictates “employee benefit structures or their
administration”99 or provides “alternative enforcement mechanisms.”100 A
state law is not ERISA-preempted under § 514(a) merely because of its
“indirect economic influence” on employee benefit plans.101
It is hard to reconcile Travelers’ more forgiving approach to
ERISA preemption with Shaw. The Court has, so far, declined to confront
the tension in its ERISA preemption case law.102
Often, the tension between Shaw and Travelers does not matter.
For example, Maryland’s “Wal-Mart” Act is ERISA-preempted under
either approach.103 However, as I discuss below, the California Act
presents a case where the two different formulations of ERISA preemption
lead to two different outcomes. ERISA preempts the Act’s employer
mandate and the Act’s authorization of voluntary employer contributions
under the Shaw standard with its near automatic preemption of state law.
However, the Act’s employer mandate and optional employer contributions
survive under the revised and more compelling approach to ERISA §
514(a) later embodied in Travelers.
V.

THE PAYROLL DEDUCTION IRA SAFE HARBOR

ERISA preempts state laws as such laws “relate to any employee
benefit plans”104 governed by ERISA. ERISA identifies two kinds of
employee benefit plans,105 “welfare” plans,106 which provide fringe
benefits such as medical, sickness and death benefit coverage, and
“pension” plans,107 which provide “retirement income to employees”108 or
otherwise result “in a deferral of income by employees for periods

99

Id. at 658.
Id.
101
Id. at 659.
102
See Zelinsky, supra note 93, for a discussion on the tension within the
Supreme Court’s ERISA preemption case law.
103
Edward A. Zelinsky, Maryland’s “Wal-Mart” Act: Policy and Preemption,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 847, 851-70 (2006).
104
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
105
29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2006).
106
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006).
107
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2006).
108
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i) (2006).
100

2014

CALIFORNIA DREAMING

565

extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond.”109
The regulations of the Department of Labor (DOL) create a safe
harbor from ERISA regulation for what have come to be called “payroll
deduction IRA” arrangements.110 Per the regulations,111 a payroll deduction
IRA arrangement is not a “pension” plan for ERISA purposes, chiefly
because only the employee contributes to his IRA under such an
arrangement; there are no employer contributions. Since it is not a pension
plan, a payroll deduction device is not an “employee benefit plan” and thus
is not regulated by ERISA. Consequently, ERISA § 514(a) does not
preempt a state law relating to a payroll deduction IRA arrangement
because such a payroll deduction arrangement is not an employee benefit
plan for purposes of ERISA. The drafters of the California Act attempted
to qualify the Golden State’s program for this safe harbor112 so that the
program will constitute a payroll deduction IRA arrangement, subject to
state regulation, rather than an ERISA-regulated pension plan with respect
to which state law is preempted.
The DOL regulations define a payroll deduction IRA arrangement,
outside ERISA’s coverage, as a “completely voluntary”113 scheme which is
109

29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
Announcement 99-2, 1991-1 CB 305; see also EBSA & IRS, Payroll
Deduction IRAs for Small Businesses, www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/
PayrollDedIRAs.pdf.
111
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d) (2013).
112
S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100032 to the CAL.
GOV’T CODE (2012), describing the Act as permitting and requiring “payroll
deposit retirement savings arrangement[s].”).
113
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(ii). Employees’ participation in the withholding
program created by the Act would be “completely voluntary” because every
employee under the Act would have the option to opt out of the program. S.B. 1234
§3 (Cal. 2012) (adding §§ 100014(c)(3), 100032(e)(1) and 100032(g) to the CAL
GOV’T CODE (2012)). There is a counterargument that participation in the program
would not be “completely voluntary” since the employee would have the burden of
opting out. However, this burden does not seem weighty enough to conclude that
employees’ participation in the program would be less than voluntary. The
Department of Labor (“DOL”) came to a similar conclusion in the context of health
savings accounts (“HSAs”). Specifically, DOL’s Employee Benefits Security
Administration concluded that “the establishment of an HSA by an employee [is]
‘completely voluntary’” when an employer creates and funds an HSA as long as the
employee “may move the funds to another HSA or otherwise withdraw the funds.”
Robert J. Doyle, Health Savings Accounts – ERISA Q&As, FIELD ASSISTANCE
110
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solely employee-financed.
No contributions can come from the
employer.114 Under an IRA payroll arrangement, the “sole involvement of
the employer” “is without endorsement to permit the sponsor to publicize
the program,” “to collect contributions through payroll deductions,” and to
remit such contributions to the employees’ respective IRAs.115
Payroll deduction IRA arrangements contrast with two other IRAbased retirement savings devices, the “simplified employee pension”
(SEP)116 and the “simple retirement account (SRA).”117 For purposes of the
present discussion, the principal difference between these IRA-based
savings devices and payroll deduction IRAs is that employers make
contributions to SEPs and SRAs, but do not make contributions under
payroll deduction IRA arrangements. Because the employer contributes to
a SEP or a SRA, a SEP or a SRA is (unlike a payroll deduction IRA) an
ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan.118
Under a SEP, the employer makes contributions to IRAs for its
employees in proportion to such employees’ respective compensation.119
SRAs require employer contributions emulating the safe harbor
contributions for 401(k) plans. Specifically, an employer sponsoring SRAs
for its employees must either match employees’ salary reduction
contributions to their IRAs120 or must contribute across-the-board to
BULL. NO. 2006-02, Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor (Oct. 27, 2006), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fab2006-2.pdf. This
conclusion is persuasive and confirms that employees’ participation in the
withholding program created by the Act would be “completely voluntary” within
the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(ii).
114
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(i).
115
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(iii). Moreover, the employer cannot receive
“consideration in the form of cash or otherwise, other than reasonable
compensation for services actually rendered in connection with payroll
deductions.” 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(iv).
116
26 U.S.C. § 408(k) (2006).
117
26 U.S.C. § 408(p) (2006).
118
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2006).
119
26 U.S.C. § 408(k)(3) (2006). Before 1997, employers could establish socalled “SAR-SEPs,” simplified employee pensions with salary reduction
arrangements under which employees can also contribute to their respective IRAs
subject to 401(k)-type deferral testing. While existing SAR-SEPs were
grandfathered, new SAR-SEPs can no longer be created. 26 U.S.C. § 408(k)(6)(H)
(2006).
120
See infra notes 204-210 and accompanying text.
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employees’ IRAs at a rate of 2% of each employee’s compensation.121
As I discuss infra,122 if a California employer were to make
employer contributions under the provisions of the Act authorizing such
optional employer contributions, these voluntary employer contributions
would convert the California program for this employer from a payroll
deduction IRA arrangement,123 limited to employee contributions, into an
ERISA-regulated employee pension plan, namely, either a SEP or a SRA
financed by employer contributions. As I also discuss below,124 under
Shaw, ERISA § 514(a) preempts the provisions of the Act authorizing
employer contributions though those provisions are not preempted under
Travelers.
VI.

THE ACT’S NOTIONAL ACCOUNTS ARE NOT INDIVIDUAL
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
A. APPLYING THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF ERISA AND THE CODE

A fundamental question is whether the accounts established under
the Act are individual retirement accounts for purposes of the Code. The
drafters of the Act labeled these as “accounts” and intended for these selfproclaimed accounts to qualify as individual retirement accounts.125 The
Act prohibits the board from implementing “the program if the IRA
arrangements” offered under the program “fail to qualify for the favorable
federal income tax treatment ordinarily accorded to IRAs under the
Internal Revenue Code . . . .”126
The cash balance-style notional accounts established by the Act do
not qualify as individual retirement accounts under the Code as the Act’s
accounts do not benefit directly from investment gains nor do such
121

26 U.S.C. § 408(p)(2)(B)(i) (2006). The 2% employer contributions under
simple retirement accounts are similar to the 3% employer contributions under one
type of 401(k) safe harbor arrangement. 26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(12)(C) (2006).
122
See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
123
This assumes that the Act will be amended to convert its cash balance-style
“nominal” accounts into true IRAs that allocate investment risk to the account
holder.
124
See infra notes 211-219 and accompanying text.
125
S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100043 to the CAL.
GOV’T CODE (2012)).
126
Id.
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accounts bear investment losses. The accounts created by the Act are
notional accounts that give the employee a formula-based defined benefittype claim against the assets held collectively by the Trust. That claim is
not based on the value of those Trust assets. California’s program is not a
defined contribution arrangement with individual accounts assigning
investment risk and reward to the account holder. Accounts under the Act
will be credited with an assumed rate of return determined before the
commencement of the year.127 For any year, the Trust’s actual investment
performance may prove to be higher, the same as, or lower than the rate
assumed before the year began. The board can retroactively allot to the
program accounts some, all, or none of the Trust’s “excess” investment
gains above the stated rate of return. In any event, accounts under the Act
will not be decreased to reflect the Trust’s investment losses.
Consequently, the cash balance-style notional accounts that the Act
authorizes are not individual retirement accounts.
Internal Revenue Code § 408, which establishes the “individual
retirement account” as a matter of federal law, does not define that
statutory term. However, as part of ERISA (which created the IRA),128
Congress twice129 adopted a statutory definition to distinguish defined
contribution arrangements, such as money purchase pensions130 and profit
sharing plans,131 from defined benefit pensions. The ERISA (i.e., Title 29)
version of this definition makes clear that the term “individual account
plan” is synonymous with “defined contribution plan” and provides that,
[t]he term “individual account plan” or “defined
contribution plan” means a pension plan which provides
for an individual account for each participant and for
127

Id. (adding § 100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
See An Act to Provide Pension Reform, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2002(b), 88
Stat. 829, 959-66 (1974) (adding § 408 to the United States Code, creating the
individual retirement account).
129
As observed supra, many provisions of ERISA were adopted twice, once as
additions to the Internal Revenue Code and once as additions to Title 29 of the
United States Code, enforced by the Department of Labor. See supra note 6.
130
On money purchase pension plans, see ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 2;
LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 50-51; LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L.
MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS 33 (3d ed. 2012).
131
On profit sharing plans, see ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 2, 4, 14; LANGBEIN
ET AL., supra note 6, at 51-52; FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 130, at 33-34.
128
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benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the
participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and
losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants
which may be allocated to such participant’s account.132
The Internal Revenue Code version of this definition, today part of the tax
statute as 26 U.S.C. § 414(i),133 is identical except that the tax law
exclusively uses the term “defined contribution plan.”
Under this twice-enacted definition, an account exists for
retirement savings purposes only when a participant’s interest in his own
account is “based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant’s
account, and any income, expenses, gain and losses, and any forfeitures of
accounts . . . which may be allocated to such participant’s account.”134 An
individual account does not exist for retirement savings purposes if an
external formula, operating independently of actual earnings and losses,
determines a participant’s entitlement under the retirement plan. Thus, a
retirement account (in contrast to a defined benefit arrangement) exists
only when investment risk is placed directly on the account holder so that
all investment gain automatically inures to the advantage of the account
holder and investment losses decrease the account holder’s entitlement
under the plan.
In contrast, the Act’s notional, cash balance-style accounts do not
reflect the Trust’s actual investment experience but instead implement a
defined benefit-style formula, namely, contributions augmented by an
assumed rate of return unreduced by any losses. Under the California Act,
the account holder is entitled to this formula-established amount,
regardless of the Trust’s actual investment performance. The account
holder’s interest does not derive directly from the value of the assets held
by the Trust. Rather, the account holder has a defined benefit-style,
formula-based claim against the collective fund held by the Trust. This
formula ignores losses and automatically credits each account with an
assumed rate of return, regardless of the Trust’s actual investment
performance. Hence, the accounts to be created under the Act do not
comply with the statutory mandate that IRAs must provide “benefits based
solely upon the amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any
132

29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006).
26 U.S.C. § 414(i) (2006).
134
29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006).
133

570

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 20.2

income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures . . . .”135
Suppose, for example, a year for which the California board
assumes a return of 3% while the Trust established by the Act actually
experiences a net investment gain of 5%. The board could retroactively
allocate this “excess” investment gain to the program’s accounts or could
consider this superior investment performance in setting the stated return
for the following year. The board may also do both or neither. Under any
of these scenarios, there will be no direct connection between the Trust’s
investment performance and the accounts’ balances. Any investment gain
is mediated through the board and its implementation of the statutory
command to assume a rate of return before the beginning of each year.
Suppose, moreover, a year in which the Trust losses money on the
investments it holds. The Act does not authorize a decrease in account
balances to reflect these losses. Following a loss year, the board might
assume a 0% return so that account balances stay the same in the face of
the prior year’s investment losses. However, the statutory definition of an
individual account requires that losses reduce account balances.136 As the
Act is written, there is no provision for such loss-based reductions to
account balances under the California program.
In short, as a statutory matter, all retirement accounts, including
individual retirement accounts, must directly reflect investment gains and
losses. The formula-based, cash balance-style accounts fashioned by the
California Act do not and thus cannot constitute individual retirement
accounts under Internal Revenue Code § 408.
B. APPLYING THE CASE LAW ON RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
Also instructive in this context is the seminal decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp.137 Connolly, and its progeny,138 confirm that the defined
135

Id.; I.R.C. § 414(i) (2006).
Id.
137
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 581 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1978).
138
Connolly has been cited and followed in three subsequent decisions
addressing the distinction between defined benefit pensions and defined
contribution/individual account plans: Concord Control, Inc. v. Int’l Union, United
Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 647 F.2d 701, 704-05
(6th Cir. 1981); Matter of Defoe Shipbuilding Co., 639 F.2d 311, 313 (6th Cir.
1981); In re Gray-Grimes Tool Co., Inc. Pension Plan, 546 F. Supp. 102, 107-09
136
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benefit-style accounts established by the Act are not individual retirement
accounts for purposes of the Code.
The question before the court in Connolly was whether a
multiemployer139 pension plan was a defined benefit plan, subject to the
plan termination insurance administered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (“PBGC”), or was a defined contribution/individual account
plan, outside the coverage of the PBGC and its insurance program.140
Starting with ERISA’s statutory definition of a defined
contribution/individual account plan,141 the appeals court concluded that
the plan at issue in Connolly was a defined benefit pension because
benefits were based on a formula rather than the actual investment
experience of any particular individual account.
The appeals court noted that, under the Connolly plan,
“[c]ontributions on behalf of participants are pooled in a general fund . . .
[T]he participant has no right, title, or interest in these [contributed]
amounts.”142 Rather, the participant’s entitlement under the plan was based
on a specified formula. Such a formula is a feature of a defined benefit
plan, which, as its name implies, defines for each participant a retirement
benefit by applying a formula established in the plan. This formula applies
irrespective of the plan’s actual investment performance.
In Connolly, the plan’s formula utilized the participant’s years of
service to determine the participant’s retirement benefit. Under the
California program, a cash balance-type formula creates a notional account
consisting of cumulative contributions adjusted by an assumed rate of
return, unreduced by any losses. The board can, but need not, retroactively
credit accounts with some or all of the Trust’s “excess” investment
earnings. As is true of the cash balance accounts that the Act’s accounts
emulate, actual investment performance will not directly increase the
participants’ benefits in their accounts in the California program, nor will
investment losses decrease such benefits.
Also instructive in this context is the supplementary test deployed
by the Connolly court, the possibility of underfunding. “[B]y definition, an
(E.D. Mich. 1982).
139
For discussion of multiemployer pension plans, see LANGBEIN ET AL., supra
note 6, at 70-77.
140
29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (2006) (PBGC insurance does not apply to “an
individual account plan”).
141
29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006).
142
Connolly, 581 F.2d at 733.
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individual account plan can never be underfunded”143 since the account
holder is entitled to whatever total his account grows or falls, based on the
account’s actual investment performance. In contrast, there can be
underfunding with cash balance notional accounts since these are defined
benefit devices; if plan assets are less than a cash balance participant’s
notional account total, the participant is still entitled to this larger formulabased total. Conversely, if a cash balance plan has more assets than are
necessary to pay every participant the amount in his notional account, that
excess can revert to the employer.144
Like the plan at issue in Connolly, the California program creates
a defined benefit-type cash balance entitlement that may be underfunded
(or overfunded). Whether assets in the Trust are more or less than the
amount in participants’ notional accounts, the California participants are
entitled to their respective formula-based entitlements as reflected in those
notional accounts.145 If assets in the Trust are insufficient to pay these
amounts, the account holders will have a claim against the Trust’s
collective assets for the holders’ respective formula-based benefits. The
California account holder under the Act has a defined benefit-type claim
against this total pool of Trust assets, a claim for the formula-based total in
his notional account.
Significant in this context is the Act’s authorization of the board to
purchase insurance to guarantee against underfunding.146 As the Ninth
Circuit observed in Connolly, individual account plans cannot be
underfunded. Insurance against underfunding is the hallmark of a defined
benefit pension that promises a benefit-based formula independent of the
value of the assets actually financing the pension. Today, defined benefit
insurance is administered by the PBGC, established by ERISA.147 If a
defined benefit pension plan is covered by such insurance148 and if the
143
144

Id.
Such a reversion is subject to the excise tax of Code § 4980. I.R.C. § 4980

(2006).
145

S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 2011) (adding § 100008(c) to
the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
146
Id. (adding § 100010(a)(9) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)).
147
The PBGC and its insurance program are established in ERISA § 4001, 29
U.S.C. § 1301 (2006). For background on the PBGC, see LANGBEIN ET AL., supra
note 6, at 238-40; FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 130, at 626-30.
148
Certain defined benefit plans are not subject to the PBGC and the insurance
it provides. 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)-(c) (2006).
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assets held by the plan’s trust are inadequate to pay promised benefits, the
PBGC’s insurance coverage makes up the difference for basic, insured
benefits.149
Under California’s Act, the board administering the program and
Trust is authorized to obtain similar insurance from a private insurer.150
This authorization indicates the risk of defined benefit underfunding under
the Act. Underfunding insurance is not purchased for a defined
contribution account since there is no promised benefit to insure and thus
no risk of underfunding against which to insure.
In short, under the statutory definition of a retirement account as
explicated by Connolly, an individual account benefits directly from
investment gain, loses value from investment losses, is not controlled by a
formula separate from such gains and losses, and cannot be underfunded
since the account holder is entitled to whatever his account balance may
be. Hence, the notional accounts under the Act are not individual
retirement accounts. Rather, the accounts created under the Act reflect a
defined benefit-style formula that gives the account holder a fixed claim
against a collectively-invested trust fund. The Trust’s investment gains
will not automatically pass through to participants’ program accounts but
rather will be mediated by the board through its choice of an assumed rate
of return and its decision whether or not to credit accounts with the Trust’s
“excess” earnings. Since the Act’s accounts can be underfunded (why else
should the board buy insurance against the risk of underfunding?), those
accounts are not individual retirement accounts.
The same conclusion emerges from the appeals courts’ decisions
under the Code version of the definition of a defined contribution plan,
Code § 414(i).151 The most recent of these appeals court decisions is
George v. United States.152 In George, the taxpayers were retirees from
federal service who, while working, had participated in the Civil Service
Retirement System (CSRS). These taxpayers had contributed to the CSRS
from their salaries with after-tax dollars while the federal government, as
employer, matched those contributions. When they retired, the George
taxpayers elected to receive their own after-tax contributions as lump sum
distributions while the remainder of their respective CSRS retirement
149

29 U.S.C. §§ 1322-1322a (2006).
S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100010(a)(9) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE
(2012)).
151
I.R.C. § 414(i) (2006).
152
90 F.3d 473 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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benefits (attributable to employer contributions and earnings) were paid
over time as annuities.
The issue in George was whether the lump sum and the annuity
constituted a single, integrated contract or whether the lump sum
(consisting of the employees’ own contributions) was a separate defined
contribution pension plan, treated for tax purposes apart from the annuity.
Under the former characterization, the lump sum (deemed to be integrated
with the annuity) was taxable for income tax purposes. Under the latter
characterization, the lump sum (deemed to be a separate defined
contribution plan) was a tax-free refund of the taxpayers’ own, already
taxed contributions.153 The George taxpayers, relying on Code §§ 72(d)
and 72(e)(5)(E), claimed that their contributions to the CSRS constituted a
separate defined contribution plan. From this premise, the lump sum
payments were the tax-free return of their respective after-tax
contributions. The IRS, relying on Code § 72(e)(2)(A), asserted that the
lump sum payments to the CSRS retirees were linked to the ongoing
annuity payments and were thus fully taxable. The resolution of this issue
turned on the applicability of Code § 414(i): were the taxpayers’ after-tax
contributions a separate defined contribution pension plan or were they
part of the annuity paid by the CSRS?
The Federal Circuit, agreeing with two other courts of appeals,154
held that the taxpayers’ after-tax contributions did not constitute a separate
defined contribution plan with a “separate account”155 because a defined
contribution plan must have an “investment-performance feature,”156 i.e.,
153

“Employee contributions...under a defined contribution plan may be treated
as a separate contract.” I.R.C. § 72(d) (2006). A lump sum distribution “received
on or after the annuity starting date” is fully includable in gross income. I.R.C. §
72(e)(2)(A) (2006). However, I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(E) provides the counter rule for a
lump sum “in full discharge of the obligation under the contract which is in the
nature of a refund of the consideration paid for the contact.” I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(E)
(2006). Such a lump sum in the nature of a refund is not taxable, but rather a return
of the employees’ consideration.
The taxpayers in George, relying on Code §§ 72(d)-(e)(5)(E), claimed that
their contributions to the CSRS constituted a separate defined contribution plan.
Hence, the lump sums they received were in the nature of a tax-free return of the
taxpayers’ own contributions. 90 F.3d at 477.
154
Montgomery v. United States, 18 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 1994); Malbon v.
United States, 43 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 1994).
155
I.R.C. § 414(k) (2006).
156
George, 90 F.3d at 477.
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investment gains and losses must be allocated to the alleged account
holder.
Since the George taxpayers were not allocated any investment
gains and losses attributable to their after-tax contributions, those
taxpayers did not participate in any separate defined contribution pension
plan with individual accounts. The lump sum payment from the CSRA did
not come from a true individual account that grew from investment gains
and incurred investment losses.
Particularly helpful in this context is the George Court’s
discussion of Guilzon v. Commissioner,157 the only appeals court decision
holding that the lump sums received by CSRS retirees derive from a
defined contribution plan separate from the annuities paid by CSRS to
these retirees. Rejecting Guilzon, the Federal Circuit correctly observed
that, contrary to the conclusion of Guilzon, “[u]nder the concept of a
defined contribution plan . . . if income is earned, that income is to be
added to the participant’s account.”158 In contrast, the Act’s notional
accounts are not true accounts directly absorbing investment risk. Hence,
such notional accounts are not individual retirement accounts under Code §
408.
C. CONSIDERING CRITIQUES
Consider in this context seven potential critiques of my conclusion
that the program accounts established by the California Act are not
individual retirement accounts for purposes of the Code. First, an
individual retirement account can be invested in a fixed income instrument.
The individual retirement account so invested resembles the notional
accounts established under the Act. Thus, this initial critique would
continue, the accounts under the Act are not so different from conventional
individual retirement accounts after all.
To explore this challenge, let us suppose that an individual
retirement account with a balance of $100 is invested in a corporate bond
that pays interest of 2% annually. At the end of the year, this account
predictably has $102, reflecting the original principal and the first year’s
interest. Suppose now that an account established under the Act is credited
with $100 in employee contributions and that, for the year, the board
157
158

985 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1993).
George, 90 F.3d at 478.
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assumes a rate of return of 2%. At the end of the year, this account under
the California Act will also have a balance of $102. This similarity, the
argument goes, implies that the Act’s accounts are individual retirement
accounts for purposes of Code § 408 since the Act’s accounts simulate
individual retirement accounts invested in fixed income instruments.
As far as it goes, in this example the individual retirement account
resembles the notional account under the Act. However, this resemblance
evaporates upon further consideration of investment risk and reward.
Consider, for example, a scenario in which interest rates spike mid-year.
In this case, the principal balance in the individual retirement account
automatically declines as the bond decreases in value. In contrast, the
California account holder has a formula-based, fixed dollar claim against
the collective assets of the California trust. If those assets go down, or up,
in value, the account holder has the same claim for $102 against the Trust
since the assumed rate of interest for the year (2%) was fixed by the
California board before the year began.
The story is similar if interest rates decline. In this case, the value
of the bond in the individual retirement account rises to the financial
advantage of the account holder as the account’s balance grows in tandem
with the increase in the bond’s value. In contrast, the California account
holder’s entitlement under his notional account is the same fixed, formulabased amount of $102 even as the value of the bond spikes due to lower
interest rates. Under the Act, any investment gain from falling interest
rates inures to the Trust and its collective pool, not to any account holder.
The board may elect to retroactively allocate some or all of this gain to
participants’ accounts or may for the following year increase the stated
investment return to reflect the prior year’s increase in the Trust’s assets.
But the board need not do so.
Even if the board takes these retroactive steps, there will be no
direct link between the Trust’s investment performance and participants’
account balances. Under the California Act, any connection between
investment performance and account balances is mediated by the board
through its selection of a stated rate of return and the board’s decision
whether or not to credit to accounts the Trust’s “excess” earnings. At the
end of the day, there is a significant difference between an individual
retirement account, the value of which is tied directly and automatically to
investment gains and losses, and a formula-driven account under the Act,
which is not linked directly or automatically to investment gains or losses.
A second rebuttal to the conclusion that the accounts created by
the Act are not individual retirement accounts under the Code would assert
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that the definition of “account” is different for IRAs than for defined
contribution plans, such as money purchase pensions and profit sharing
arrangements. If so, Code § 414(i)159 and the case law decided under it are
irrelevant to IRAs.
However, Code § 414(i) is, by its terms, applicable, not only to
money purchase and profit sharing plans, but to § 408160 as well; § 414(i)
applies to the “part” of the Code that includes § 408.161 As a textual matter,
the term “account” in § 408 is most plausibly read to mean the same thing
for IRAs as for other defined contribution plans covered by the same part
of the Code, i.e., a retirement account where investment gain and loss
automatically and directly inure to the benefit (or detriment) of the account
holder.
A third challenge, related to the second, would assert that, in the
context of IRAs, it is not in practice important to define rigorously the
concept of an “account.” In the context of employer-sponsored retirement
plans, the distinction between defined contribution/individual account
plans and defined benefit pensions is crucial for many purposes. For
example, employers guarantee the benefits promised under defined benefit
pensions but do not guarantee outcomes under individual account plans.162
Congress has imposed limits on the employer stock a defined benefit
arrangement may own, but has levied no equivalent restrictions on defined
contribution plans.163 There are different vesting schedules for defined
contribution and defined benefit plans.164 In these and other settings, it is
159

I.R.C. § 414(i) (2006).
I.R.C. § 408 (2006).
161
That part of the Code is Part I of Subchapter D which extends from Code §
401 through Code § 420, inclusive, and thus includes Code § 408, governing IRAs.
See I.R.C. §§ 401-420 (2006).
162
Despite its relatively narrow focus, Justice Stevens’ Nachman opinion is
generally cited as confirming that employers guarantee defined benefit pensions.
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U.S. 359 (1980). As
a statutory matter, it is today the minimum funding rules and the PBGC insurance
arrangement which lock employers into the defined benefit commitments they
make. I.R.C. §§ 412, 430, 431, 436, 4971 (2006); ERISA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 1081
(2006) (minimum funding rules); ERISA § 4062, 29 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006)
(sponsoring employers liability to PBGC in case of distress termination).
163
29 U.S.C. § 1107 (2006).
164
Compare I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(A) (2006), and 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A)
(2006) (vesting schedules for defined benefit plans), with I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(B)
(2006), and 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B) (2006) (vesting schedules for defined
160
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critical to determine which plans have “accounts” and which do not.
However, the argument would conclude, there are no similar consequences
in the context of individual retirement accounts and thus no need to define
such accounts with particular rigor.
However, the term “account” does play an important role in the
context of individual retirement arrangements as the Code distinguishes
individual retirement accounts from individual retirement annuities: such
annuities can only be issued by insurance companies complying with state
regulation of insurance.165 It is, moreover, unconvincing to read the term
“account” differently at different places within the same statute. Code §
408 was enacted as part of ERISA, which simultaneously embedded the
definition of an account in both Code § 414 and the labor, i.e., Title 29,
version of ERISA.
A fourth argument would contend that California could defend the
Act in its current form by asserting that the Act’s notional accounts fall
within the Code’s authorization of individual retirement annuities. If the
Act’s notional accounts can, for purposes of the Code, be characterized as
such annuities, then it is unnecessary for those accounts to comply with the
Code and ERISA requirement that accounts allocate investment gains and
losses to account holders.
It is no accident that the drafters and sponsors of the Act elected
to characterize the participants’ interests in the California program as
“accounts.” By labeling those interests as “accounts,” the proponents of
the Act appealed to the broad public acceptance of the now-established
defined contribution paradigm with its emphasis on account-based
ownership devices166 such as 401(k) accounts,167 individual retirement
accounts,168 Section 529 accounts,169 and health savings accounts.170 In
contrast, despite the persuasive argument for annuities as savings and
retirement devices,171 such annuities do not resonate the same way with the
public today. Would a majority of the Golden State’s legislators have been
contribution plans).
165
I.R.C. § 408(b) (2006).
166
Zelinsky, supra note 66, at 31-37.
167
Id. at 49-52.
168
Id. at 52-58.
169
Id. at 64-69.
170
Id. at 62-64.
171
Id. at 15-23; TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT
AGAINST PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 122-25 (2008).
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willing to impose mandatory “annuities” on their constituents? I’m
skeptical. Framing matters.172
Against this background, it is unpersuasive for California to call
the notional accounts created in the Act “accounts” when addressing the
California populace through the Golden State’s statute books while
simultaneously telling the IRS, the DOL, and, ultimately, the courts that
these “accounts” are really “annuities” under the Code.
Moreover, if the Act’s accounts are individual retirement annuities
for purposes of the Code, those putative annuities cannot be offered by the
Trust created under the Act. As a statutory matter, individual retirement
annuities must be underwritten by insurance companies, complying with
the state’s statutes and regulations pertaining to insurance.173 However, the
Trust is not required to comply with the insurance statutes and regulations
of the Golden State.174
Just as the defenders of the Act might be tempted in ipse dixit
fashion to declare the Act’s accounts as annuities, they might also be
tempted to proclaim arbitrarily that the Trust is an insurance company even
though the Trust need not comply with the same rules as apply to
commercial and nonprofit insurers operating in the Golden State.175 Such a
formalistic, indeed hollow, relabeling of the Trust as an insurance
company would be unpersuasive. The evident purpose of the statutory
172

Scholars today give much attention to “framing effects.” At one level, the
research on framing effects itself reframes the long-recognized reality that it
matters how issues are defined. For contemporary research on framing effects, see
Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and The Paradox of Tax Expenditure
Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797, 807-11 (2005); Edward J. McCaffery & Joel
Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance, in BEHAVORIAL
PUBLIC FINANCE 3, 7-8 (Edward J. McCaffery and Joel Slemrod eds., 2006). For a
classic instance of an astute politician who understood what we today call framing
effects in the context of retirement policy, see ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 113
(discussing Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to finance Social Security through
payroll taxes so “no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program.”).
173
See I.R.C. § 408(b) (2006) (individual retirement annuities must be “issued
by an insurance company”); Treas. Reg. § 1.408-3(a) (1986) (individual retirement
annuities must be “issued by an insurance company which is qualified to do
business under the law of the jurisdiction in which the contract is sold.”); see
generally CAL. INS. CODe.
174
See generally CAL. INS. CODE.
175
Id.
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requirement of Code § 408(b) is to assure the holders of individual
retirement annuities that those annuities receive the substantive protections
of state insurance law. That purpose is eviscerated if an entity, like the
Trust, is by ipse dixit declared to be an insurance company while relieved
of the substantive requirements governing all other insurers.
At the end of the day, California’s legislature elected to
characterize the Act’s accounts as accounts rather than as annuities and
chose to offer those accounts through a state-sponsored Trust rather than
through insurance companies complying with California’s insurance laws.
California should be held to those choices. And the notional accounts
created by the Act do not qualify as individual retirement accounts since
they do not allocate gains and losses to account holders.176
Yet a fifth challenge to my conclusion that the Act’s accounts are
not individual retirement accounts would dispute the similarity of the
California program to a cash balance-style defined benefit plan. If the
assets funding a cash balance pension are inadequate to pay promised
benefits, the sponsoring employer is liable for the shortfall.177 However,
California has explicitly disclaimed responsibility for any liabilities of the
Trust or the program178 – a disclaimer not available to the private sector
sponsor of a defined benefit plan. Similarly, if there are surplus assets in a
cash balance plan when the plan terminates, these assets may revert to the
sponsoring employer.179
An analogy need not be perfect to be persuasive. Even if we take
at face value California’s declaration that the Golden State’s treasury does
not stand behind the Trust and the program,180 the accounts to be
established under the Act are notional in nature. Like a participant in a
cash balance pension, a participant in the California program will have a
formula-based claim against the Trust rather than a true individual account
under which investment gains automatically flow through to the
176

As I discuss infra, another state (or even California itself) could pursue a
different course from the Act by openly declaring that private sector employees
otherwise without work-based retirement savings coverage must purchase
individual retirement annuities. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
177
See ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 14.
178
S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE
§§ 100013, 100014(c)(3), and 100036 (2012)).
179
Subject to the potential reversion tax of I.R.C. § 4980 (2006).
180
S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100013,
100014(c)(3), and 100036 (2012)).
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participant’s account and losses reduce the participant’s account balance.
The Act is silent as to the distribution of surplus assets if the Trust
were to terminate in overfunded condition. Perhaps the Trust’s extra funds
would be distributed to present and/or former participants in the program.
Or perhaps these surplus assets would go to the California treasury in a
manner analogous to a reversion to an employer sponsoring a defined
benefit plan. We don’t know. In any event, the program and its accounts
need not perfectly mimic a private sector cash balance pension for such a
pension to be the most useful analogy. That is the case, given the cash
balance-style, formula-based entitlement of account holders under the
California Act.
A sixth argument is that there is no policy reason to deny
individual retirement account status to the accounts to be established under
the Act. A believer in the ownership society would disagree, arguing that
true individual accounts correspond with cultural norms about ownership
and give the account holder a direct stake in the American economy as a
result of his unmediated participation in the upside and downside of
investment performance.181
Had the 93rd Congress foreseen the possibility of cash balance
accounts, it might have drafted Code § 408 to include within the definition
of an individual retirement account the kind of defined benefit, notional
account established under the California Act. But Congress did not. It is
anachronistic to blame Congress for this omission (assuming it was an
omission) because the cash balance plan was far in the future and could not
have been anticipated in 1974. It is, moreover, not apparent that, had the
drafters foreseen the possibility of formula-based cash balance accounts,
they would have included them within the definition of individual
retirement accounts for purposes of Code § 408. In any event, Congress
did not draft Code § 408 in a way which qualifies cash balance accounts as
individual retirement accounts since cash balance accounts are formulabased and do not allocate investment gains and losses directly to
participants’ respective accounts.
Consider finally my argument that the private insurance the Act
authorizes the board to purchase is analogous to the insurance the PBGC
issues to defined benefit pension plans to protect against the underfunding
of promised benefits. This similarity, I argue, indicates that the accounts
authorized by the California Act are defined benefit devices, insurable like
181

ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 97-101.
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defined benefit pensions, and thus outside the statutory definition of an
individual retirement account: insurance is only needed against the risk of
underfunding when underfunding can occur.
Defined contribution
accounts cannot be underfunded since account holders are entitled to
whatever their respective accounts are worth, based on actual investment
performance.
The counterargument is that the insurance authorized by the Act is
similar to an insurance-type product purchased inside an individual
retirement account. Such accounts, for example, can invest in guaranteed
income contracts (GIC), which, the argument goes, are similar to the
insurance the board can buy under the Act.
The controlling difference is the nature of the claim created by an
insurance-type product inside an individual retirement account, as opposed
to insurance protecting a formula-based benefit. When an individual
retirement account is invested in a GIC or similar device, the account
holder’s entitlement is defined and limited by that contract. If the insurer
or other financial institution issuing the GIC defaults, the account holder
has no further claim against the account. The GIC (or similar insurancetype device) is an investment like a bond or stock: if the GIC goes bellyup, the loss falls on the individual account holder.
However, the insurance to be purchased under the Act is designed
to guarantee a cash balance-style defined benefit formula, i.e., the
employees’ contributions increased by a stated rate of return, unreduced by
investment losses. If the issuer of the insurance acquired by the board
defaults, the account holder still has a claim against the Trust for his
formula-based benefit.
Again, the analogy, while not perfect, is
instructive. The insurance to be purchased by the California board
underwrites a cash balance-style benefit just as the PBGC issues insurance
to protect the equivalent formula-based promises made by defined benefit
plans.
D. SUMMARY
In sum, the Act imposes investment reward and risk on the Trust
and the collective funds the Trust will hold. The cash balance-style
accounts created by the Act are proclaimed by the Act to be “accounts.”
However, these notional accounts are not individual retirement accounts
since the account holder has a formula-based defined benefit-type interest
in his account and does not himself benefit directly from good investment
performance or suffer from poor investment performance.
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VII. NO ERISA PREEMPTION UNDER TRAVELERS OF THE ACT’S
EMPLOYER MANDATE
Under the Act, the board can only implement the program if the
accounts implementing the program qualify as individual retirement
accounts under the Code.182 This caveat reflects the drafters’ intent for the
program to qualify as an IRA payroll deduction arrangement, subject to
state regulation because such an arrangement is not an employee benefit
plan for ERISA purposes.183 This caveat also assures the participants in the
program that they will receive the tax benefits associated with IRAs.184
Because the accounts established under the Act are not individual
retirement accounts, the most compelling course for California’s
legislature would be to abandon the cash balance-style formula currently
embedded in the Act by amending the Act to recast the accounts to be
offered by the program as true individual retirement accounts which assign
investment risk and reward directly to the participating employees. It is
thus necessary to consider whether, if the Act were so amended,185 the
Act’s employer mandate would be ERISA preempted. Shaw says “yes”
while Travelers says “no.” Travelers, as the Court’s more recent and more
compelling construction of § 514(a) and ERISA preemption, should
control and should thus protect the employer mandate of the California Act
from ERISA preemption – if the Act’s accounts are reformulated as bona
fide individual retirement accounts.
The Act’s employer mandate explicitly refers to employersponsored retirement plans, exempting from the mandate all Golden State
employers who sponsor such plans.186 Under the unforgiving Shaw test
(“connection with or reference to”), ERISA § 514(a) preempts the Act’s
employer mandate since that mandate refers to employers’ retirement plans
by exempting from the mandate employers sponsoring retirement plans for
182

S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100013,
100014(c)(3), 100036 (2012)).
183
29 C.F.R. §2510.3-2(d) (2007).
184
I.R.C. §§ 219, 408(e)(1) and 408A(d)(1) (2006).
185
In order for the program accounts established under the Act to qualify as
individual retirement accounts, it is also necessary for the Trust to satisfy the IRS
that the Trust will be administered in a fashion “consistent with the requirements
of” I.R.C. § 408. See I.R.C. § 408(a)(2) (2006). It should not be difficult for the
Trust to satisfy this standard. See Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(e) (1986).
186
S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(d) (2012)).
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their respective workforces.
Consider in this context the last of the Shaw line of cases, District
of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade.187 In that case, the
U.S. Supreme Court declared as ERISA-preempted a District of Columbia
law requiring employers to provide to injured employees receiving
workers’ compensation the same health insurance employers provide to
their active workers.
Since employer-provided medical coverage
constitutes an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan,188 the Court held,
the D.C. law impermissibly “refer[red] to” such ERISA-regulated
employee benefit plans by requiring that injured employees receive the
same medical coverage as furnished by the ERISA-regulated employee
benefit plans in effect for active employees.
The application of Greater Washington Board of Trade to the
California Act’s employer mandate is straightforward: like the D.C. statute
the Court held to be preempted, the California Act explicitly refers to
employers’ ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans, exempting from the
obligation to participate in the Act’s state-sponsored withholding program
any employer which maintains a retirement plan for its employees.189 Thus,
under the unforgiving Shaw test (“reference to”), the Act’s employer
mandate is ERISA-preempted as the mandate refers to employer-sponsored
retirement plans by exempting employers maintaining such plans – just as
the District of Columbia statute referred to employer-sponsored medical
plans for active employees as the standard for medical coverage to be
provided to injured employees.
Travelers, however, undermines Shaw. Under Travelers’ approach
to § 514(a), the Act’s employer mandate is not ERISA-preempted.
Underlying Travelers’ approach to ERISA § 514(a) are a variety of themes
which cannot be reconciled with Shaw: the interpretation of § 514(a) in
any situation, Travelers declares, starts with the “presumption that
Congress does not intend to supplant state law.”190 The legislative purpose
animating ERISA’s preemption provision was “to avoid a multiplicity of
[state] regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration
of employee benefit plans.”191 Such national uniformity is particularly at
risk when a state law dictates “employee benefit structures or their
187

506 U.S. 125 (1992). See Zelinsky, supra note 91, at 826.
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administration”192 or provides “alternative enforcement mechanisms.”193 A
state law is not ERISA-preempted under § 514(a) merely because of its
“indirect economic influence” on employee benefit plans.194 Starting from
these Travelers premises, the Act’s employer mandate is not ERISApreempted because there is a presumption that Congress preferred not to
supplant the Act, the Act’s employer mandate has no effect on employers
maintaining their own retirement plans for their employees, and the Act’s
mandate does not impair national uniformity in the administration or
content of employer-sponsored retirement plans. Indeed, the Act says
nothing about such administration or content.
To explore further the contrast between Shaw and Travelers,
consider the Supreme Court’s first ERISA preemption decision after
Travelers, California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc.195 Separately-funded apprenticeship
programs are ERISA-regulated employee welfare plans.196 On public
construction projects, California law permits contractors to pay lower than
prevailing wages to apprentices only if the state approves the
apprenticeship program. Under Shaw, this California statute refers to and
has a connection with ERISA-governed welfare plans, namely separatelyfunded apprenticeship programs. Hence, applying Shaw, the California
wage law should be preempted under ERISA § 514(a).
However, following Travelers, the Dillingham Court sustained the
California wage statute as that statute merely had an “indirect economic
influence”197 on ERISA-regulated apprenticeship programs in the Golden
State. The impact of the California law was “quite remote”198 from
concerns about plan benefits and plan administration. Hence, the
Dillingham Court declared, ERISA did not preempt the California statute
challenged in that case. Dillingham thus buttresses the conclusion that,
under Travelers’ more forgiving approach, the Act’s employer mandate is
not ERISA-preempted.
While less sweeping than Shaw, post-Travelers ERISA preemption
still has substantial bite in particular cases. In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex. rel.
192

Id. at 658
Id.
194
Id. at 659.
195
519 U.S. 316 (1997).
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29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006).
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Breiner,199 for example, the Court held that § 514(a) prevents the
application to any ERISA-governed employee benefit plan of a
Washington State statute that, on a participant’s divorce, automatically
revokes any beneficiary designation of the participant’s former spouse.
The Washington law, the Egelhoff Court declared, “interferes with
nationally uniform plan administration” of ERISA-regulated plans200 by
requiring an employee benefit plan operating in Washington State to
disregard a beneficiary designation on file with such plan if the designation
names a former spouse as beneficiary.
In contrast, the Act has no impact on California employers
maintaining retirement plans or payroll deduction IRA arrangements.
These employers can with impunity ignore the Act, the Trust, and the
program. The Act does not regulate the content or processes of a
California employer’s retirement plan or an employer’s IRA payroll
deduction arrangement. If a California employer is required to enroll in
the program (assuming the Act is amended to qualify the Act’s accounts as
individual retirement accounts), the employer will thereby participate in a
program which is not an employee benefit plan for ERISA purposes:
California’s state-sponsored program (assuming amendment of the Act)
will qualify as a payroll deduction IRA arrangement which is not an
employee benefit plan under ERISA.201
For ERISA preemption purposes, the Act (if amended to establish
bona fide individual retirement accounts) is more like the California
apprentice wage statute sustained in Dillingham than the Washington State
divorce-related law stricken in Egelhoff. The latter unacceptably impinged
upon the administration of ERISA-regulated plans by requiring
199

532 U.S. 141 (2001). For discussion of Egelhoff, see Edward A. Zelinsky,
Employer Mandates and ERISA Preemption: A Critique of Golden Gate
Restaurant Association v. San Francisco, 50 STATE TAX NOTES 503, 512 (2008)
(hereinafter Zelinsky, Golden Gate II); Edward A. Zelinsky, Egelhoff, ERISA
Preemption and the Conundrum of the `Relate To' Clause, 91 TAX NOTES 1917
(2001).
200
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148.
201
By way of contrast, an employer subject to the employer mandate of the
San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance must provide specific health care
benefits under its own, ERISA-regulated program, or, in the alternative, must
participate in the City’s Health Access Program (HAP), which establishes an
ERISA-governed health care program. See Zelinsky, Golden Gate II, supra note
199, at 4-7.
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administrators to run their respective plans in accordance with Washington
State law rather than the pre-divorce beneficiary designations on file with
the plan. The California Act, in contrast, does not impinge upon
employers’ retirement plans or such plans’ operations. The Act just
requires employers without such plans or IRA withholding arrangements to
participate in a state-sponsored IRA withholding program, a program
which is not an employee benefit plan for ERISA purposes.202
As the Court’s later and more persuasive203 interpretation of
ERISA preemption, Travelers should prevail over Shaw. Thus, the Act’s
employer mandate should survive ERISA preemption if the Act’s accounts
are recast as individual retirement accounts. Per Travelers, the Act has no
direct effect on employers’ retirement plans and does not affect the content
or administration of such plans. The Act will merely require employers
without retirement plans to maintain their own IRA payroll arrangements
or to participate in the California program, a publicly-administered IRA
payroll arrangement which is not an employee benefit plan for ERISA
purposes.
VIII. NO ERISA PREEMPTION OF EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS
UNDER TRAVELERS
Similar observations apply as to the provisions of the Act
authorizing employers to make voluntary contributions204 to employees’
program accounts: under Shaw, this portion of the Act is ERISApreempted, but, under Travelers, the Act’s authorization of optional
employer contributions survives § 514(a) scrutiny. Travelers is the Court’s
later and more compelling interpretation of § 514(a) and thus should spare
from ERISA preemption the Act’s authorization of supplemental employer
contributions. The Act neither requires employers to make contributions
nor requires employers to affirmatively elect against such contributions.
The employer who makes voluntary contributions under the Act to
employees’ accounts will, by virtue of such contributions, convert the
202

29 CFR § 2510.3-2(d) (2010).
Despite these rulings the author continues to believe that there is an
interpretation of ERISA § 514(a) which is better than either Shaw or Travelers,
namely, to treat § 514(a) as creating a rebuttable presumption of ERISA
preemption. See Zelinsky, supra note 91, at 839-58.
204
S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE
§§ 100004(e) and 100012(j) (2012)).
203
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program for such contributing employer from a payroll deduction IRA
arrangement into an ERISA-regulated employee benefit pension plan.
Payroll deduction IRA arrangements retain that classification only if the
employees make all contributions pursuant to such arrangements.205 If a
California employer makes contributions under the program, the program
would for ERISA purposes thereby become an employee pension plan for
that employer, an employer-financed plan which both “provides retirement
income to employees”206 and which “results in a deferral of income by
employees.”207 Employers making supplemental contributions to
employees’ accounts under the Act would need to comply with the rules
for either a simplified employee pension208 (SEP) or a simple retirement
account209 (SRA). Either way, an employer’s contributions to the program
would result for that employer in a pension plan for ERISA purposes, an
employer-financed arrangement providing retirement income and deferring
income.210
Shaw preempts the Act insofar as the Act would take California
employers down the path of employer contributions. As to contributing
employers, the state-run program and the Trust will be an ERISA-governed
pension plan because of such employers’ contributions to the program.
Under Shaw and its nearly automatic standard for ERISA preemption, the
Act would have the ultimate “connection with” an ERISA-regulated
employee benefit plan: the Act would create such a plan whenever
employers make supplemental contributions to employees’ accounts as
205

29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d) (2010).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i) (2006).
207
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
208
I.R.C. § 408(k) (2006). S.B. 1234 adds to the Government Code §
100010(b), which requires the board to promulgate regulations “to ensure that the
program meets all criteria for federal tax-deferral or tax-exempt benefits, or both.”
S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100010(b) (2012)). This
statutory requirement would mandate regulations qualifying voluntary employer
contributions under the program to take the form of either simplified employee
pensions or simple retirement accounts.
209
I.R.C. § 408(p) (2006).
210
While governmental plans are largely immune from regulation under
ERISA, the program created under the Act is not a governmental plan for purposes
of ERISA since the program covers employees in the private and nonprofit sectors,
not the employees of governments. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (1974) (defining
governmental plans as covering government employees); 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1)
(1974) (stating that Title I of ERISA does not apply to governmental plans).
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such employers’ contributions under the Act would, for ERISA purposes,
convert their payroll deduction arrangements into employee benefit plans.
Consider in this context the Supreme Court’s Shaw-based decision
in FMC Corp. v. Holliday.211 In FMC Corp., the Court held that ERISA §
514(a) preempts Pennsylvania’s anti-subrogation law from applying to
self-insured212 welfare plans. If, as FMC Corp. holds, a state law
regulating employee benefit plans impermissibly “relate[s] to”213 the plans
the law regulates, a fortiori a state law that creates employee benefit plans
is similarly ERISA-preempted as relating to the plans it creates. Hence,
under the Shaw framework, the California Act, insofar as it establishes an
ERISA-governed pension plan for employers’ contributions, has an
impermissible “connection with”214 the employee pension plans the Act
thereby establishes.
Again, however, the Travelers approach to ERISA-preemption is
more forgiving, permitting state laws which have “indirect economic
effects” on employers’ retirement plans as long as such laws do not impair
the nationally uniform content or administration of such plans. The Act’s
authorization of supplemental employer contributions does not impair
national uniformity in the structure or administration of employee benefit
plans. Any California employer can ignore the Act’s authorization of
optional employer contributions. The Act thus has no impact, indirect or
otherwise, on such employers.
In two respects, Egelhoff is instructive in this context and confirms
that, under the more forgiving approach to ERISA preemption inaugurated
in Travelers, the provisions of the California Act authorizing supplemental
employer contributions are distinguishable for ERISA preemption
purposes from the Washington State statute the Court struck in Egelhoff.
First, writing for the Egelhoff Court, Justice Thomas observed of the
Washington State statute revoking beneficiary designations on divorce that
“[u]niformity is impossible . . . if plans are subject to different legal
obligations in different states.”215 In contrast, the California Act’s
authorization of voluntary employee contributions imposes no “legal
obligations” on any California employer, as the Act does not require a
211

498 U.S. 52 (1990). See Zelinsky, supra note 91, at 822-23.
The Pennsylvania law survived preemption as to insured ERISA plans as a
permitted regulation of insurance. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 60.
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California employer to make contributions. The Act simply permits
supplemental contributions by an employer that elects to make such
optional contributions. No California employer is legally obligated to
make voluntary contributions – unlike the Washington State employers in
Egelhoff who were legally required to follow that state’s law revoking
beneficiary designations of former spouses.
Second, an employer in Washington State can elect “to opt out”216
of the Washington State statute revoking beneficiary designations on
divorce. As Justice Thomas pointed out, this “opt out” option, if replicated
by other states, would threaten nationally uniform administration of
ERISA-regulated plans by requiring an interstate employer to opt out stateby-state. Thus, if the Washington State statute at issue in Egelhoff were
reproduced nationwide, “the burden” of opting out of each state’s statute
would be “hardly trivial”.217 As to the Washington law,
[i]t is not enough for plan administrators to opt out of this
particular statute. Instead, they must maintain a familiarity
with the laws of all 50 States so that they can update their
plans as necessary to satisfy the opt-out requirements of
other, similar statutes.218
In contrast, a California employer need not elect against
supplementary contributions under the Golden State’s Act. A California
employer who is ignorant of the optional contributions authorized by the
Act suffers no consequences. A nationwide employer could similarly
ignore the voluntary employer contributions permitted by any other state
statute modeled on the California Act. An employer need not “opt out” of
a statute when compliance with that statute is voluntary – as is compliance
with the California Act’s provisions permitting, but not requiring,
supplementary employer contributions.
Thus, at the end of the day, whether ERISA preempts the
California Act’s authorization of optional employer contributions depends
(as does the ERISA preemption status of the Act’s employer mandate)
upon the standard used to interpret ERISA § 514(a). Under the older, more
sweeping Shaw test (“reference to or connection with”), ERISA
216
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218
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preemption of state law is nearly automatic. By authorizing optional
employer contributions, the California Act connects with employers’
ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans by creating such plans when
employers make optional contributions. Shaw thus counsels that § 514(a)
preempts the Act’s authorization of voluntary employer contributions as
such employer contributions would convert the program created under the
Act from an IRA payroll deduction arrangement without employer
contributions into an ERISA-regulated employee pension plan with such
contributions.
However, Travelers’ more forgiving approach to ERISA
preemption protects the Act’s authorization of supplemental employer
contributions under § 514(a). The California Act neither obligates
employers to make voluntary contributions nor requires employers to
affirmatively reject an obligation to make such contributions. Thus, the
Act’s authorization of optional employer contributions survives under the
Supreme Court’s more recent and more persuasive articulation of ERISA
preemption in Travelers: employer contributions convert the program into
an employee pension plan for ERISA purposes, but the Act imposes no
obligations on employers which, under the more forgiving standards of
Travelers, would trigger ERISA preemption.
Just as it is necessary to amend the Act to convert its notional, cash
balance-style accounts into individual retirement accounts, it is also
necessary to amend the Act’s prohibition on supplementary employer
contributions if such contributions “cause the program to be treated as an
employee benefit plan under” ERISA.219 The drafters of this provision
evidently concluded that, if employer contributions convert the Golden
State’s program into an employee benefit plan for ERISA purposes, ERISA
preemption necessarily follows.
Travelers points to a different conclusion: even though for ERISA
purposes employer contributions convert the California program into an
employee benefit plan for the employers making such optional
contributions, the Act is not ERISA-preempted under Travelers. The
employer contributions authorized under the Act are purely voluntary. The
Act imposes no burden on California employers with respect to their
retirement plans or with respect to the design or administration of their
retirement plans. Hence, per Travelers, ERISA does not prohibit employer
219
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contributions under the program, even though such contributions convert
the program to an employee pension plan for ERISA purposes. The Act
should accordingly be amended to delete the Act’s current requirement that
employer contributions be suspended if they would “cause the program to
be treated as an employee benefit plan under” ERISA.
IX.

OTHER CHOICES

The foregoing analysis indicates that the Act would survive
ERISA-preemption under Travelers were the Act amended to recast the
California program’s accounts as individual retirement accounts which
allocate investment reward and loss to the individual account holder. If the
Act were so amended, an employer’s withholding under the California
program would qualify as an IRA payroll deduction arrangement which is,
for ERISA purposes, not an employee benefit plan since only amounts
withheld from the employees’ wages would be paid to the Trust. If any
California employers make optional contributions under the Act, for those
contributing employers, the program would become an employee pension
plan, but would survive ERISA-preemption under Travelers. Under the
older and tougher Shaw standard, the Act’s employer mandate is ERISApreempted, whether or not the employer makes supplementary
contributions under the program. However, Travelers is the Court’s later
and more compelling construction of ERISA § 514(a);220 the Act, if
amended to convert its formula-based notional accounts into individual
retirement accounts, should survive ERISA preemption under Travelers
since the Act would impose no obligations or burdens on employers and
their retirement plans.
That the Act, as amended, would be legal does not mean that the
Act, as amended, would be sound policy. In this final section, I outline
some of the alternatives available to a state legislature (or a Congress) that
contemplates following California’s lead in encouraging retirement
savings.
Any such outline starts with the fact that there is, as the Act’s
advocates observe, a serious problem, namely the failure of moderate and
low-income workers to save for retirement. Some critics of the California
220
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Act portray the Act as an effort to grab private savings to rescue
underfunded pensions for public employees. 221 Even if that is so, the Act
on its face is aimed at a real shortcoming in our national retirement system.
Our defined contribution culture places the burden of retirement saving on
the worker himself. Most low- and moderately-paid workers save little or
nothing for retirement.222
Other commentators on the Act raise the opposite fear, namely that
California’s taxpayers will be seen as implicitly guaranteeing the cash
balance-style defined benefits promised to participating employees under
the Act in its current form.223 From this vantage, the ultimate risk down the
road is not using private retirement savings to rescue public pensions, but
requiring the public treasury to make good future underfunding of the
notional, cash balance-style accounts created under the Act.
Both risks are mitigated if, as I urge, the Act’s current notional,
cash balance accounts are changed to true individual accounts which
allocate directly investment risk and reward to the employee/account
holders. If the Act’s accounts are converted to individual retirement
accounts, there would be no underfunding for California’s taxpayers to
finance since an individual retirement account holder is simply entitled to
his or her account’s current total, whatever that total may be in light of
investment gains and losses. Moreover, it would be more difficult
politically for a future legislature to divert funds from a Trust consisting of
accounts under which each account holder, as an individual retirement
account owner, has a claim for his particular investment-based balance
rather than a fixed, formula-based benefit. As noted above, framing

221

See, e.g., Mimi Walters, The Government Seizure of Private Retirement
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matters.224 And it would matter to an account holder if his balance were
reduced by a future legislature’s diversion of assets to buttress public
employees’ pension plans.
Not every problem has a solution nor is the solution to every
problem a statute or a public program. However, the supporters of the Act
raise a compelling concern when they point to the systematic failure of less
affluent workers to save adequately for retirement.
I conclude that, in this area, Brandeisian experimentation225 by the
states is desirable, both to test different models (including the model of no
state action) and to respond to different preferences (including a preference
for no state action).226
To take one example, automatic enrollment is an area where stateby-state experimentation could prove productive. It is plausible for the
California Act to let workers opt out of the program’s coverage. If a lowor moderate-income worker finds her current cash needs too pressing to
make retirement savings, that is a regrettable decision with long-term costs,
though it is reasonable to let the worker make that decision for herself. On
the other hand, if a state legislature with more paternalistic instincts were
to make retirement savings mandatory with no ability to opt out, the
resulting experiment might produce useful information. While I am
skeptical of such paternalism, a preference for state experimentation entails
an openness to experiments about which one is not particularly
enthusiastic.
At the other end of the spectrum, an equally plausible choice is for
states to continue to do nothing about the problem of private retirement
savings. There is a vigorous market in retirement products, plans, and
services;227 the federal government gives tax credits to both small

224

See sources cited supra note 172.
The classic statement of the states as laboratories for experimentation is
Justice Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932).
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My predisposition for state experimentation leads me to skepticism about
ERISA preemption, which, even under Travelers, emphasizes national uniformity.
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at 514.
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employers establishing qualified plans228 and to low-income individuals
undertaking retirement savings.229 A state legislator concerned about the
negligible retirement savings of rank-and-file workers could reasonably
conclude that these market-based alternatives and federal tax credits
occupy the field to the exclusion of any state-based policies.
Alternatively, that legislator could conclude that the state, instead
of enacting a California-style Act, should supplement the federal tax
credits for employers and workers with state tax credits, just as some states
supplement the federal earned income tax credit230 with an additional state
tax credit on earned income.231 Or that legislator could instead define the
problem as lack of knowledge and conclude that the appropriate state
policy is to publicize the federal tax credits for small employers
establishing qualified plans and for low-income workers who save for their
respective retirements.232
Among the interesting features of the California Act is the
prospect233 (some would say, inevitability)234 that CalPERS, the state
pension plan for the Golden State’s public employees, will invest part or
all of the funds held by the Trust for private sector workers. If the
legislature proceeds with the Trust retaining the Act’s notional, cash
balance-style accounts, having a state pension fund take responsibility for
the Trust’s investments increases the risk that a future legislature will be
compelled to use taxpayer funds to cure any shortfall. Even though the
California legislature has explicitly disclaimed any state guarantee of the
program’s accounts,235 if CalPERS (or another public agency) oversees the
investment of employees’ withheld wages, at least some participants in the
228
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state-sponsored program will conclude that the state which, through its
pension fund, directs the investment of their retirement savings stands
behind the investment performance of the state’s own agency. The
disclaimer of state liability the California legislature placed in the Act236
can be eliminated by a future legislature. There will be greater political
pressure to cure any future shortfall with tax-generated funds if the
California’s own pension fund fails to achieve the stated, cash balancestyle return promised to program participants by the board.
Even if the California legislature amends the Act to create true
individual retirement accounts or another state’s legislature modifies
California’s approach to create such accounts, state pension funds have not
been without their own problems.237 Moreover, if bona fide individual
retirement accounts were invested by CALPERs or another state agency,
some account holders will likely conclude that the state is, at some level, a
guarantor of adequate investment performance.
On the other hand, prominent invoices, including David
Swenson,238 Professor Forman,239 and Professor Munnell,240 argue that
rank-and-file employees will never be good investors. From this premise,
it is a potentially valuable service for the state to provide to these
employees state pension plans’ professional investing skills to manage
236
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such employees’ retirement accounts.
Here again my personal preference is for state experimentation,
despite my skepticism about some of the possible experiments.241 A state
could plausibly mandate that every private employer maintain an
retirement savings arrangement for its employees (whether a qualified plan
or a payroll deduction IRA program) without the state itself getting into the
business of investing private employees’ retirement savings.242 This is the
approach embodied in President Obama’s proposed employer mandate,
i.e., employers with more than ten employees would be required to
maintain retirement plans or IRA savings programs, but there would be no
public investment vehicle like the California Trust.243
The argument for investing retirement funds privately (rather than
through a public entity like the Trust) is reinforced by both the DOL’s
recently-adopted regulations requiring fee disclosure244 and soon-to-be
proposed regulations heightening the fiduciary obligations of investment
advisors.245 If successful, these regulations should reduce the fees paid by
pension plans and participants and should better align the interests of
investment counselors with the interests of these plans and participants.
The skeptics246 could retort that, even with these desirable changes, most
employees will never be good investors and thus would benefit from the
investment services of CalPERS and other professionally-run state pension
funds. Different states’ experiments would help determine who is right.
Yet a final alternative for a legislature favoring the kind of cash
241
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balance formula embodied in the Act would be to mandate that employers
purchase for their otherwise uncovered employees individual retirement
annuities247 offered by insurance companies. State-mandated annuities are
likely to meet greater popular resistance than state-mandated accounts. In
our defined contribution culture, the norm for savings is today based on the
account model.248 But cultures change and can be changed.
A particular interesting variant of the mandatory annuity
alternative is for the state requiring such annuities to charter a statesponsored insurance company to provide annuities. A state-run company
could be the exclusive purveyor of annuities for those employees
participating under the state retirement savings program or the state
provider of annuities could instead be a TVA-style public option,
competing against private insurers. While my personal enthusiasm for this
possibility is limited, a commitment to Brandeisian experimentation
implies that I could be surprised.
X.

CONCLUSION

The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act is
important both because of California’s size and status as a trendsetter and
because the Act targets a pressing problem, the lack of retirement savings
by low-income workers. The notional cash balance-style accounts created
by the Act do not qualify as individual retirement accounts since the
accounts authorized by the Act create a defined benefit-type, formulabased claim against a collectively-managed fund. Under the Code and
ERISA, individual retirement accounts directly allocate investment gains
and losses to the individual account holder.
The Act could be amended to recast its accounts as true individual
retirement accounts that assign investment risk and loss directly to the
account holder. If so, the Act’s employer mandate and supplemental
employer contributions should survive ERISA-preemption under Travelers.
Legality does not equate with wisdom and thus the Act, along with President
Obama’s proposed federal mandate, should provoke debate about the need
and best means to encourage greater retirement savings by the less affluent.
In that debate, I favor state-by-state experimentation rather than any single
approach to the task of encouraging greater retirement savings.
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